The importance of common infrastructure
One of the issues that arose during the Oakland Hills fire was the incompatibility of hydrant connections. Besides water supply issues, many neighboring departments were unable to connect to Oakland’s fire hydrants because the connections were not compatible with the fire hoses of other departments. This led to delays in getting water on the fire and added immense friction to firefighting operations.
Oakland planned to distribute adapters to the neighboring departments, but this proved problematic. It was a significant enough issue that led to statewide legislation requiring all California cities to adopt standardized hydrant connections with at least one 2.5-inch outlet. As a matter of practice, most municipalities generally have at least an additional 4-inch or 4.5-inch connection for increased water volume availability.
California Code 8607–1 codified this requirement statewide, with an exception for San Francisco, whose leaders successfully convinced state lawmakers to exempt the city due to the perceived difficulty of compliance.
The EWSS is independent from the primary hydrant system and is intended to provide an alternate means of water supply if the primary hydrant system fails; however, it is not expansive throughout the city.
We have two main fire hydrants in San Francisco: low-pressure and high-pressure. Approximately 8,800 low-pressure hydrants (LPH) are most commonly used for water supply in firefighting operations. They are located on nearly every street corner and have two 3-inch outlets.
Some fire hydrants in the Presidio have 2.5-inch and 4.5-inch outlets, consistent with state code. However, these hydrants are maintained by the National Park Service. In the event of a major disaster, we will require mutual aid from other departments. Distributing adapters to responding engines will likely be as problematic as it was in Oakland in 1991, leading to delays in engine responses. Adhering to state fire hydrant standards will minimize operational friction for outside agencies.
Emergency Water Supply System: San Francisco’s unique, historic, and incomplete backup
We also have a secondary system of high-pressure hydrants (HPH), which is unique among American cities. HPH has three 3.5-inch outlets and is part of the Emergency Water Supply System (EWSS), serving as an auxiliary system supplied by three different reservoirs at varying elevations: Jones Street at Nob Hill, Ashbury near Clayton and Carmel Streets, and Twin Peaks by Farview Court. This system was designed and built in response to the 1906 earthquake, following the failure of the primary hydrant system.
The EWSS is independent from the primary hydrant system and is intended to provide an alternate means of water supply if the primary hydrant system fails. However, it is not expansive throughout the city. It can only be operated by San Francisco Fire Department personnel because it requires specialized training and proprietary equipment unique to the department. When built, the system was only extended as far as development existed at the time of the 1906 quake and fire. For example, it does not extend west of 19th Avenue in the Sunset District, leaving over four square miles and more than 100,000 residents at risk of having no backup water supply.
To have disaster resiliency on the west side, the EWSS must be expanded. There have been several proposals, but short-term solutions include purchasing hose tenders, which carry up to 5,000 feet of large-diameter hose that, when deployed, create an above-ground hydrant system. However, setting up these requires a significant workforce and time, which will already be scarce in a disaster. Furthermore, while firefighters from other departments can assist with set-up, the effort must be led by San Francisco Fire Department personnel.
The good news
While San Francisco has many vulnerabilities to fire in its resiliency plan, it also has several strengths. There is a plan to expand the EWSS, but it is in the discussion phase. Hose tenders are an interim solution. However, a comprehensive expansion of the EWSS would provide greater resiliency.
We have fireboats that can pump seawater into our portable hydrant system, but use is limited near Ocean Beach.
Our Neighborhood Emergency Response Team (NERT), a corps of trained citizen volunteers that supplement fire department response in an emergency, is one of the most robust in the state. There are even plans to make going through NERT training a high school graduation requirement.
The San Francisco Fire Department has recently become a member agency of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Urban Search and Rescue Task Force, a federal team comprising fire departments from the Peninsula, bringing a more robust response capability to the city and the region.
The city has initiated a hazard tree mitigation plan to remove invasive Eucalyptus trees in various locations throughout the city, including near Laguna Honda Reservoir and at the end of O’Shaughnessy Boulevard at Glen Canyon.
However, we still have much work to do. We must be more aggressive in brush clearing and hazard tree removal in San Francisco. We need to accelerate the pace at which we place utility and power lines underground, which is one of the biggest obstacles to firefighting operations. We need more acceptance for mutual aid and training with neighboring departments. Even small changes, such as placing blue reflective markers in the street to indicate fire hydrant locations, can go a long way in reducing operational friction and increasing the chances of getting water to the fire faster.
Many of these proposals will likely not be popular or easy, and city leaders are often complacent when it comes to disaster preparedness. However, we do not get to decide when disasters will strike. Whether it’s a conflagration, earthquake, or tsunami, we must do everything possible to mitigate the disaster and save lives, even if it’s difficult or politically unpopular. Many of our past leaders were bold in conceiving solutions to harden our city against future disasters. We must continue the legacy and constantly seek to improve our envisioned ideas.
The author is a former wildland firefighter with extensive experience in wildland/urban interface operations who has been deployed to numerous large-scale fires around the United States, as well as having served with volunteer fire departments in Southern California. The author is currently a state fire marshal-certified fire instructor who has instructed in fire academies statewide, with extensive knowledge in fire engine pump operations, hydraulics, and disaster operations.